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ABSTRACT
It is usual to associate the word “demagogue” with bad political leadership. At worst, it is also usual 
to think about a leader that uses deception and feeds on the more primal emotions of the people to get what 
he wants. But, in reality, answering the question of what a demagogue was is far from easy. Thus, this 
paper hypothesizes that there is no substantial difference between a demagogue and a rhetor in Athenian 
democracy. As its method, the paper analyses the context of use of the term by the different actors as to 
shed some light on their intentions. First, the paper examines the concept of “demagogue” and how the term 
appears in the democratic tradition, by focusing on its usage in the works of authors such as Aristophanes, 
Lysias and Thucydides. Next, it refers to the way in which adversaries of Athenian democracy, especially 
deriving from philosophy, used the term. As this paper will show, there is a significant difference between 
the two usages, the former being descriptive and the latter pejorative. Finally, the paper concludes that both 
in the descriptive and pejorative sense, being a demagogue meant to be a rhetor, a leader of the demos.




It is fairly commonplace to associate Athenian democracy with a “reign of dem-
agogues”, especially by the end of the 5th century BC, when the Peloponnesian War 
was coming to an end. It is not an unreasonable association, given the number of 
controversial decisions taken by the assembly, which not only would lose the war for 
Athens but also endanger the survival of democracy itself. These actions, such as the 
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Sicilian Expedition in 415 BC, would have allegedly been instigated by demagogues. 
But what did being a demagogue mean?
After all, when we think of a demagogue, the idea of a rabble-rouser comes to 
mind. A popular leader that uses the people to attain power. As Moses Finley puts 
it in his classic article Athenian Demagogues: “the demagogue is driven by self-in-
terest, by the desire to advance himself in power, and through power, in wealth. To 
achieve this, he surrenders all principles, all genuine leadership, and he panders to 
the people in every way” [Finley 1962: 4]. In this account, rather than leading the 
people, a demagogue misleads the people. But there is more to it than that.
Indeed, the term is problematic given that its pejorative connotations are not at 
all common in the Greek democratic tradition; on the contrary, neither demagogos 
nor demegoros imply a negative sense for “demagogue”. Finley himself recognizes 
that, understood in a more neutral way, “demagogues were a structural element in 
the Athenian political system” [Finley 1962: 19]. There is also a positive way of 
understanding it, or rather of understanding it in opposition to a pejorative version of 
the concept. This can be found in the conceptualizations of Plato and Aristotle along 
with the aforementioned pejorative sense, wherein Plato’s “demagogue” serves as 
the shadow term for “statesman” (politikos), the former one being harmful political 
leadership and the latter virtuous political leadership.
Whereas for Plato all democratic leaders are demagogues, for Aristotle there is 
a distinction between the democratic leaders of the past and the ones that led Athens 
by the end of the 5th century, especially those who came after Pericles. In light of 
this, we can understand why philosophers of that time are characterized as enemies 
of democracy, given that their work is the main source for the pejorative connotation 
of the term [Lane 2012: 187]. This is no coincidence, as I will argue.
When we go back to Finley’s remarks about demagogues being a structural part 
of democracy and understand a demagogue to be a leader of the people that uses the 
very people he leads to override the laws, we can see then what lies in the background: 
a profound and old mistrust of democracy and its principles of equality between all 
citizens and equality in voicing their views in the assembly, this is, isonomia and 
isegoria. These principles, they believed, led unequivocally to a form of tyranny and 
a growing ground for demagogues.
With this in mind, I propose the following hypothesis: There is no substantial 
difference between a demagogue and a rhetor in Athenian democracy. In any case, 
the difference lies with the usage of the term, whether it is by a supporter or not of 
the democratic system. Thus, to demonstrate this point, first, I will explain the view 
of the democratic partisans, which used the term in a descriptive manner, if they used 
it at all. Then, I will tackle the view of the “enemies of democracy”, mostly from the 
philosophical tradition, and how this view was successful and used today, in some 
contexts. Finally, I will draw some concluding remarks and see if the hypothesis 
was successfully argued.
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THE RHETOR, LEADER OF THE DEMOS
In ancient Greece, a demagogue (demagogos) was a leader (agos) of the people 
(demos), that is, the many which composed the community of citizens in the city. 
On the other hand, a demegoros was the one who spoke before the assembly. In this 
sense, the so-called demagogue would most – if not all – of the time be both. But 
these terms had no pejorative connotations (contrary to tyranny), and “demagogue” 
seldom appears in democratic tradition, as I will argue. 
Indeed, Athenians preferred, following Melissa Lane’s account, more descriptive 
forms for referring to their political leaders, such as prostates tou demou (the person 
standing before the people), ho boulomenos (the one that takes the initiative) or hoi 
rhetores kai hoi strategoi (orators and generals) [Lane 2012: 182]. This view count-
ers the extended trend that claims that demagogos and demegoros were a common 
Greek designation for bad political leadership [Finley 1962: 7], at least outside the 
philosophical tradition.
As stated in the introduction, the core principles of Athenian democracy were 
isonomia (equality between all citizens) and isegoria (the possibility for all citizens 
to address the assembly) which had isokratia (equal share of political power) as the 
result. These principles were embodied in the Athenian assembly, and though natu-
rally not every citizen was expected to speak, those who did were highly respected 
and competed with one another to gain influence. Both courage and competition 
were values cherished by Athenian society, not only in sports and war but also in 
the political arena [Hansen 1991: 84].
In a framework such as this, it would be odd to think that Athenians used the 
term pejoratively, as being a demagogue was to comply with Athenian standards and 
values: a man that had the courage to speak before the assembly, that competed with 
his equals to gain influence and that was seen as a leader by the demos. This is not to 
say that Athenians were unaware of the dangers these rhetors posed for democracy. 
On the contrary, the institutions of the polis were set with these political risks in 
mind, and several political mechanisms had the goal of preventing them.
I will not dwell overly on what all those mechanisms were, but two of them deserve 
to be highlighted: ostracism and its successor, the graphe paranomon. The former 
was used to cast out for ten years a citizen that the demos feared had accumulated 
too much power, with his property and assets kept secure until his return. The second 
mechanism is the less known graphe paranomon, which could be invoked if a proposal 
made in the assembly was considered to be against the law, namely unconstitutional. 
When this happened, the assembly had to be summoned the next day to submit anew 
the proposal to a trial. If the citizen who proposed it would lose, then he could face 
different charges, depending on the gravity of the breach. On the other hand, if he won, 
then the proposal would pass without a further vote [Lanni, Vermeule 2013: 902–903].
Both mechanisms had little to do with bad political leadership, but rather to what 
a famed speaker might become, that is, a tyrant. There is an important distinction 
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to be made here between a demagogue (neutrally speaking, a leader of the demos) 
and a tyrannos (a tyrant), at least initially [Patapan 2019: 745]. A tyrant is the one 
who seeks his own egoistic aspirations by overturning democracy to claim absolute 
power, which sheds some light on why, for Aristotle, a demagogue and a tyrant 
become virtually the same, as will be seen later, in the next point.
That tyranny was the main political risk for Athenians can be clearly seen fol-
lowing Aristotle’s account in the Constitution of the Athenians, where he argues 
that ostracism was instated by Cleisthenes to prevent Hipparchus from leading the 
polis back to the Peisistratid tyranny [Rhodes 1993: 267–271]. Tyranny was seen 
as a crime that needed to be prevented, not punished, and ostracism permitted the 
expulsion of an individual that was becoming too powerful before he could become 
a tyrant. On the other hand, the graphe paranomon served as a mechanism for ra-
tional decision-making in the assembly, providing the opportunity to have a second 
look at legislation, acting also as a “safeguard against hasty or ill-advised legislation, 
particularly given the fear that skilled public speakers might mislead or whip the 
demos into a frenzy” [Lanni, Vermeule 2013: 903].
Thus, now we can better understand why a negative connotation for demagogue 
is nowhere to be found in Athenian democratic tradition. The rising of these “leaders 
of the demos” was not only expected, but encouraged, as proven by the institutional 
framework of the polis, which contemplated as a main political risk that any of these 
leaders accumulated an amount of influence and power so great that they would be-
come tyrants. Finley himself recognises that “demagogues were a structural element 
in the Athenian political system” [Finley 1962: 19].
DESCRIPTIVE USAGE OF DEMAGOGUE
At this point, I will review three examples of how the term appears in supporters 
or sympathizers of democracy. These are Aristophanes, Lysias, and also Thucydides, 
who we can call both a critic and a supporter of democracy, even if it is not the full 
democracy ushered in by Pericles.
The term demagogos, or at least its family of words, appears for the first time 
in the works of Aristophanes, although it is not as a noun to designate a person, but 
rather as a verb: to be a demagogue (demagogein). It appears twice in Knights and 
once in Frogs. In Knights, broadly speaking, two slaves of one demos try to bring 
down another slave, Paphlagon, that dominates the household, by promoting a worse 
slave, a Sausage-Seller. This way, the term appears two times in an exchange between 
one of the slaves and the Sausage-Seller: the first time, the slave says that: “A dema-
gogue must be neither an educated nor an honest man; he has to be an ignoramus and 
a rogue” [Aristoph. Kn. 190]. The second time, the same slave says “you possess all 
the attributes of a demagogue; a screeching, horrible voice, a perverse, crossgrained 
nature and the language of the market-place” [Aristoph. Kn. 215–220].
WHAT MAkES A DEMAGOGUE? THE FIGURE OF THE RHETOR IN THE CLOSING YEARS… 19
So, it may look like its being used in a pejorative sense, but the Greek word is 
actually demagogia, and it is descriptive, as we see that it is “not used now or no 
longer by educated men”. It captures a change of qualities in the political leader which 
is what brings the pejorative connotation. Plainly speaking, it is not demagogia itself 
that is negative, but rather what it has become. The misunderstanding arises because 
the figure of Paphlagon is clearly representative of Cleon, who was one of the most 
infamous of the demagogues.
On the other hand, in Frogs, we find the line that says Archedemus is acting 
demagogically amongst the dead, referring only to the action of practising politics: 
“[h]e’s a big politician amongst the corpses up above” [Aristoph. Fr. 420–423]. So, 
as we can see, the use of the term merely references the contrast between the polis 
of the living and the realm of Hades.
It is interesting that Aristophanes chose to use these words, which were new by 
then, but Lane’s account clarifies this matter. The most interesting reason for the 
purpose of this research (without going completely into the context of Knighs and 
Frogs in themselves) has less to do with condemning figures like Cleon and more 
with making a distinction between strategoi and those figures that were starting to 
arise and dominate in the assembly without serving as generals [Lane 2012: 186]. 
As can be seen, the term remains to be merely descriptive, and it is used as a verb 
(to be a demagogue or, by all accounts, to do politics).
In the work of Lysias [Lys. 25.9], as well as in several other authors like Isocrates 
or Xenophon, what we find is a partisan association of the demagogue family of words 
to denote those contrary to oligarchy. He uses the term to refer to Peisandros and 
Phrynichus, for example, who were democratic partisans before joining the oligarchic 
plot of 411 BC, the latter being one of the most extremist and bloody leaders of the 
conspiracy. It does not seem that the term, although partisan, is used pejoratively in 
this case either, designating someone who is for democracy, and changes sides later 
for the oligarchic faction.
Finally, although there are several others, the third example I would like to ad-
dress is that of Thucydides. In book IV of the History of the Peloponnesian War, we 
find he uses the term as a noun to describe Cleon, regarding the Pylos debate. He says: 
“These feelings were chiefly encouraged by Cleon the son of Cleaenetus, a popular 
leader (demagogos) of the day who had the greatest influence over the multitude” 
[Th. 4.21.3]. But this is the second time he provides a description of Cleon. Earlier, 
he described him as “the most violent of the citizens, and at that time exercised by 
far the greatest influence over the people” [Th. 3.36.6]. In both accounts is stated 
the influence he had over the multitude, but it seems unlikely that “popular leader” 
could be associated with being the most violent of citizens. It would be more correct 
only to say that the most violent of citizens had substantial influence over the people. 
So, the first description seems like the most descriptive.
We know Thucydides did not like Cleon, but few did in posterity. Some have said 
that it was Cleon’s blind impertinence, bombastic speech, and military incompetence 
TOMÁS PACHECO BETHENCOURT20
that led the Athenians into disastrous mistakes in the war against Sparta [Whedbee 
2004: 78]. But the grudge Thucydides holds against Cleon is also of a personal na-
ture. After Athens was defeated at Amphipolis in 422 BC where the historian was 
one of the strategoi in charge of its defence, he seems to hold Cleon responsible 
for his prosecution and exile [Whedbee 2004: 79]. This is relevant inasmuch shows 
that, despite the bad blood between the two, the term “demagogue” is only used in 
a descriptive manner, to denote a popular leader.
A member of the demagogos family words only appears regarding the oligarchic 
conspiracy of 411 BC [Th. 8.65.2] to describe the execution of Androcles on the 
account of being a popular leader (demagogias). Again, the use is merely descriptive 
and is also mentioned to refer to both democratic and oligarchic partisans, given that 
those that led the conspiracy of 411 were commonly regarded as demagogues. Even 
though Thucydides showed his sympathies for the Five Thousand, stating that “this 
government during its early days was the best which the Athenians ever enjoyed 
within my memory” [Th. 8.97.2], his use of any family word of demagogos remained 
with only descriptive capacities. The same patron repeats itself with other authors 
akin to Athenian democracy.
THE DEMAGOGUE AND THE ADVOCATORS OF DEMOCRACY
In this sense, the core of the matter here is that, from a democratic partisan’s 
viewpoint, the demagogues or rhetors were a fundamental part of Athenian democ-
racy, and the consequences of their good or bad leadership had as much to do with 
their power in the assembly and the decisions they had to make while occupying 
a political office as it had to do with the power of the assembly itself. After all, by the 
end of the 5th century BC, the Athenian assembly had the power to enact and derogate 
laws unopposed [Long 1996: 7], and was in charge of designating the strategoi and 
of taking strategic decisions in war. This unrestricted legislative capacity is what 
would allow the assembly in 411 BC to suppress the graphe paranomon and vote 
in favour of dissolving itself, ending the democratic system throughout all that year.
Indeed, the argument can be made that demagogues Peisandros and Phrynichus 
were instrumental in convincing the assembly of taking this action, amongst other fac-
tors such as the threat of violence and the Persian influence of the satrap Tissaphernes, 
but the point I want to make here is that it would not be just. They are partly to blame, 
yes, and we can judge their character and virtue, but there is another aspect that has to 
be considered. Athenians contemplated that rhetors or speakers would seek to accu-
mulate influence and power, as well as aspire to lead the polis. So much so that they 
instituted the set of mechanisms previously mentioned. But they failed.
They used the demos to override the laws, but they did not break the law. Besides, 
in this regard, it is important to remember the previous distinction between a dem-
agogue and a tyrant. Where one is a popular leader, the other seeks to overthrow 
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democracy to claim absolute power. Understood pejoratively, as we will see on the 
next point, for critics of democracy there is a clear transition from being a demagogue 
into becoming a tyrant.
To see the argument I am trying to make regarding why the actions for which 
demagogues are judged are those of the assembly and are no more than Athenian 
democracy in action more clearly, let us review the paradigmatic example of the 
Mytilenean affair of 427 BC [Th. 3.36–50]. This is interesting, because in the liter-
ature Cleon is the one shunned for his proposal – which is not saying he should not 
be – but he did not actually do anything against the laws of Athens. What happened 
was that Mytilene had revolted against the Delian League, and the Athenians were 
convinced by Cleon in the assembly to destroy the city with all its inhabitants. The 
assembly accepted, but immediately regretted having done so, and thus called for 
a second assembly in which “cooler heads prevailed” [Lanni, Vermeule 2013: 903].
Episodes such as this are good to see what prompted the need for Athenians to 
have a second look at legislation (the aforementioned graphe paranomon), in great 
part to prevent speakers like Cleon of convincing the assembly to take hasty decisions 
and enacting laws rashly. But same as rhetors were a fundamental part of Athenian 
democracy, it was too the constant process of revision and adaptations of the polis’ 
institutions to face new challenges while protecting its core principles: from ostra-
cism and the graphe paranomon to the revision of the laws and the codification of 
the ancient codes of Solon and Draco that ended by 399 BC, along with the much 
needed checks on the power of the assembly [Hansen 1991: 164].
THE DEMAGOGUE AND THE STATESMAN
My goal here is to go over the three main sources for the extended conception of 
what a demagogue was, and what demagoguery was about, namely the pejorative view-
point. The three authors I will focus on are Plato, and his division between the statesman 
(or the good political practitioner, politikos) and its shadow term, “demagogue”. Then, 
I will review the account of Aristotle, which is most interesting in its complexity and, 
finally, Plutarch’s, whose works cemented this conception of the term for posterity.
Plato, as said, was the first one that made the famous distinction between states-
man and demagogue. In his view, good political leadership consists of elevating the 
citizenship in virtue, which in turn has to do with knowledge. In one of the passages 
from Gorgias, Socrates says:
Do the orators strike you as speaking always with a view to what is best, with the 
single aim of making the citizens as good as possible by their speeches, or are they, like 
the poets, set on gratifying the citizens, and do they, sacrificing the commonweal to their 
own personal interest, behave to these assemblies as to children, trying merely to gratify 
them, nor care a jot whether they will be better or worse in consequence? [Plat. Gorg. 502e]
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In this sense, the good leader, the politikos, would have politikétechné. Only that 
man that is prepared to make the people more virtuous, and more knowledgeable, is 
a statesman. In the conversation Socrates is having in Gorgias, it is clear that that is 
the goal he is aiming at with it, saying  that “the speeches that I make from time to 
time are not aimed at gratification, but at what is best” [Plat. Gorg. 521d]. Here we 
see the connection with the ideal of the philosopher-king.
Only having shown the characteristics that make a leader good, and what is 
within the idea of true political rhetoric, can Socrates address its contrary: “flattery 
and a base mob-oratory” [Plat. Gorg. 503a], that is, aischra demegoria. The pejora-
tive connotation seems to be in demegoros, apparently emphasizing the basis for ill 
speech in the exercise of ill political leadership [Lane 2012: 189].
In the Sophist, we too find a clear distinction between demagogue and statesman 
or politikos. Here, the Eleatic visitor proposes a distinction between two kinds of “in-
sincere imitators”. One of those is the one who makes long speeches to mobs. In this 
context, the visitor asks Theaeteus if that person is a statesman (politikos) or a dema-
gogue, a popular orator (demologikos), to which he replies that it surely must be the 
latter [Plat. Soph. 268b]. A demagogue is, then, defined by its antithesis, the statesman. 
It is its shadow term: he deceits people, appeals to their passions for his own gain. 
But he not only misleads the people on the one hand but on the other, he is misled by 
the approval of the demos into believing he is a true statesman. It is, as it were, a kind 
of ignorance. For Plato, all democratic leaders are demagogues [Gribble 1999: 236].
This is a new definition, original to Plato who has preference for the demegoros 
family of words. He is talking about a public speaker that deceits the demos whether 
it be knowingly or unknowingly. By defining what is righteous political leadership, he 
is also defining what is not. As we will see now, Aristotle will follow on this states-
man-demagogue distinction but opting for the demagogos family of words, much in 
the sense of Aristophanes or Thucydides but giving it a mainly negative meaning.
Aristotle’s view is most interesting, for it appears to be directly connected with 
the state of democracy in Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War. He says in 
Book IV of his Politics that demagogues (demagogoi) are those who use the decrees 
of the people to override the laws. In other words, those who appeal to the people to 
pursue their own ends despite the laws [Arist. Pol. 4.4, 1292a1].
The context of this analysis is the consideration of different types of democracies 
by the Stagirite, specifically the fifth type, where “the multitude is sovereign and 
not the law, and this comes about when the decrees of the assembly over-ride the 
law. This state of things is brought about by the demagogues; for in the states under 
democratic government guided by law a demagogue does not arise” [Arist. Pol. 
4.4, 1292a1]. Here he alludes to a distinction between a demokratia, which would 
be analogous to Athens where, as explained before, the assembly had unrestricted 
legislative power, and a politeia, where the law is above the decrees of the demos.
Now it can be better understood why here the line between a demagogue and 
a tyrant disappears, as claimed in the previous point. The demagogue would draw 
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the people to a frenzy and, by overriding the laws, would overthrow democracy. It 
is, in this sense, a type of democracy doomed to fail or to become despotic. Indeed, 
the people turn into a composite monarch, where the many rule collectively and not 
individually. Aristotle argues then that “a democracy of this nature is comparable 
to the tyrannical form of monarchy, because their spirit is the same”, and continues 
to say that “such a democracy is not a constitution at all; for where the laws do not 
govern there is no constitution” [Arist. Pol. 4.4, 1292a1]. With this in mind, it is 
clear that although it is a pejorative use of demagogos, the, the emphasis is not on 
the demagogues themselves but rather on this form of democracy. The appearance 
of demagogues is epiphenomenal, because they are a consequence of Athenian in-
stitutional framework, as I have been arguing in this paper.
Finally, I want to briefly mention Plutarch, given that his account popularized the 
pejorative use of the term. He too distinguishes between statesman and demagogue, 
following especially Plato, although preferring Aristotle’s predilection for demagog-
os. In his opinion, good examples of demagogues are Cleon, the Roman Clodius, 
and Alcibiades, the famous, or infamous, young Athenian strategos. Whereas for 
Thucydides, Alcibiades was a potential tyrant, Plutarch considered him to be a typical 
demagogue, in the Platonic sense.
According to David Gribble, Plutarch uses the statesman–demagogue distinction 
as a model for Greek politics, falling into an oversimplification of political dynamics 
that become little more than a dichotomized tension between the individual and the 
polis, and the ensuing conflict [Gribble 1999: 278–279].
A statesman is a quasi-monarchical source of virtue and good judgment, with 
a value independent from the value of the people. Indeed, we can see Plutarch’s pre-
dilection for monarchy, as he states in Moralia, quoted by Lane: if he (the statesman) 
could choose a form of government, he would choose monarchy, like Plato, for it is 
the only system where his virtue can shine, as in any other system, especially a de-
mocracy, he would not lead but be led instead by inferior people [Lane 2012: 196].
And this is, in fact, what a demagogue is for Plutarch: that man who lets himself 
be led by the whims of the people, seeing that his power derives from them. The 
statesman–demagogue distinction works as a combination of Aristotle’s preference 
for the demagogos word family along with Plato’s new concept of politikos, including 
an inclination for favouring monarchy.
WHAT MAkES A DEMAGOGUE?
As it has been shown, there are many underlying threads that tie together all 
three conceptions of the pejorative sense for demagogue, other than the clear in-
fluence that Plato has on Aristotle and that both of them have on Plutarch. This 
is a clear distrust in democracy. In the case of Aristotle, in the type of democracy 
Athens had. 
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Then again, Athens was the paradigmatic example of democracy, although there’s 
a clear institutional difference between Athens by the end of the 5th century and in 
the fourth, after undergoing all the judicial reforms in the  years following the war. 
With those reforms, it became closer to a politeia than a demokratia.
Also, in all three cases, the institutional framework had to be set in a way that 
would allow a public speaker to undermine it, which was the case in Athens where 
the political-legislative power was accumulated by the assembly. This allows the 
demagogue to use, as Aristotle said, the decrees of the people to override the laws. 
Athenian democracy by 406 BC, around the time of the trial of the Arginusae generals 
was, by Aristotelian standards, a democracy with no constitution. It makes, then, 
the perfect setting for a charismatic leader to emerge and, using rhetoric, do as he 
pleases, leading and being led by the demos.
Still, the issue remains the same: not the orator but the democratic system. 
And the key here is to understand that every speaker in the Athenian assembly that 
would use rhetoric to convince others (the people) of his position, that would try to 
gain favour for implementing his politics and seek, finally, to lead the city, would 
be regarded by members of this tradition as a demagogue, pejoratively speaking. 
What makes, then a demagogue? To be a democratic leader, a rhetor in the assembly, 
a leader of the demos.
But now, this was not always the case, especially when it comes down to Pericles. 
Even though Plato did not have kind words for him, stating that implementing public 
payments made Athenians lazy and greedy [Plat. Gorg. 515e], Aristotle and Plutarch 
had a different opinion. Aristotle, besides recognizing different kinds of democracy, 
recognizes a “proper democracy”, a politeia, opening the door to democratic leaders 
who are not demagogues.
The association between the mentioned degeneration of democracy and recent 
events in Athens in times of Aristotle comes with the implication – which also appears 
in Thucydides – that there is a divide between the great leaders of the past, explicitly 
Pericles in Thucydides account, and the bad leaders that followed. Plutarch also con-
tinues this trend, with a profound admiration for Pericles. Further, for him, Pericles’ 
figure resembles that of a king, for he was not the same man he was before anymore, 
nor was he submitted to the people or subject to be driven by their whims [Pl. Per. XV].
But, why Pericles? Besides the obvious reasons, it is interesting to ask this 
question seriously. Why is Pericles so different from his nephew, Alcibiades? After 
all, he had an outstanding military record before gaining prominence in the public 
arena, he was extraordinarily good looking, sought by men and women alike [Xen. 
Mem. 1.2.24], and an excellent speaker, instructed by the best rhetoricians of his time 
and praised by Demosthenes himself. Moreover, he was exceptionally intelligent, 
as attested by the philosopher Theophrastus, and even had a speaking disorder than 
far from being a hindrance made him charming [kagan 1996: 63].
To explore this disparity between the admired Pericles and the renowned dema-
gogue, Alcibiades, the debate prior to the disastrous Sicilian Expedition (415 BC) is 
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most illuminating. The main players in this debate were Alcibiades, followed by the 
Athenian youth, and the experienced Nicias, who took a more conservative approach. 
The debate starts after an embassy from the Sicilian cities of Segesta and Leontini 
requested assistance [kagan 1996: 165], and the subject is, broadly speaking, about 
whether Athens should attack Sicily or not. Alcibiades is for attacking and Nicias 
is against.
I want to focus here on some of the points Alcibiades makes in his arguments. 
Nicias’ position was clear and was almost the same in every session of the assem-
bly: Athens could not afford to attack Sicily. If the Carthaginians could not conquer 
it, how could Athens? Also, the war with Sparta would soon begin anew, if it had 
been over at all, and the territories of Athens were not secure. Nicias also attacked 
Alcibiades on accounts of his age and his lavish lifestyle.
Alcibiades’ speech was a direct response: he rebutted the personal attack and 
asked to be judged by his public deeds and not his private life, exalting his role in 
obtaining victory at the battle of Mantinea. He also was conciliatory, asking the 
leadership of the expedition for Nicias (who did not want to go) and himself. There 
are several other points in the discussion, but the argument I want to emphasize is 
the one that stated the obligation Athens had to its allies, both on a moral ground (it 
was a dishonour and there was no excuse for shrinking back) and on the ground of 
interest (the Sicilian allies were the first line of defense). Additionally, Alcibiades 
maintained that the very nature of the empire required an active policy on behalf of 
allies, whether Greek or barbarian.
The emphasis is here because it is from this point on that Alcibiades mirrored 
Pericles. First, when speaking of aiding Athens’ allies we can see the similarities 
with the last Periclean speech: “You are bound to maintain the imperial dignity of 
your city in which you all take pride [...] or inaction is secure only when arrayed by 
the side of activity; nor is it expedient or safe for a sovereign, but only for a subject 
state, to be a servant” [Th. 2.63].
Then, Alcibiades revealed his plans for a Sicilian annexation, exclaiming that if 
the expedition succeeded, “as seemed likely”, the Athenians might gain control of 
all Hellas since their power would be reinforced by the addition of Sicily [kagan 
1996: 184]. Here we can also see a Periclean influence. When Pericles was challenged 
by men who advocated, in his time, for a more inactive policy, the apragmones, he 
famously told the Athenians: “You are the absolute masters of the entire sea, not 
only as much of it as you now rule but however much more you wish” [quoted in 
kagan 1996: 184].
It appears that, at least in a rhetorical capacity and, up to that point, a military 
capacity as well, Alcibiades and Pericles were not so different from each other. 
Alcibiades though had a reputation for being outrageous, and that very reputation 
is what prompted the assembly to accuse him and his followers of mutilating the 
herms (hermai), and desecrating the Eleusinian Mysteries, thus removing him from 
command in the expedition and provoking his defection to Sparta.
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We can only speculate about what would have happened if Alcibiades led the 
expedition to Sicily, but hopefully, with this digression, some light has been shed 
on why there is a line between Pericles and those that followed, like Alcibiades. It 
can be safely said that one great reason for that line existing is fortune: Pericles was 
successful and could deliver on his promises, Alcibiades could not.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper began with the research question: What did being a demagogue mean? 
In order to tackle this question, I brought forth a research hypothesis that claimed 
that there is no substantial difference between a demagogue and a rhetor in Athenian 
democracy. In any case, the difference lies with the usage of the term, whether it is 
by a supporter or an opponent of the democratic system.
Thus, the paper followed an argument distributed in four points. It started exam-
ining the terms demagogue and demegoros from an etymological perspective, as well 
as exploring the figure of the demagogue or popular leader not only as something 
Athenians expected, but also as something they encouraged, in line with their values 
about courage and competition, and with their core principles of isonomia and isego-
ria. This led to an analysis of two Athenian constitutional mechanisms – ostracism, 
and the graphe paranomon, which had the objective of preventing a popular leader 
from becoming a tyrant. This, in turn, permitted to attend to the distinction between 
demagogue and tyrant.
Then, the paper focused on reviewing some of the ways democratic partisans used 
the terms demagogos, demegoros or any of their word families. The three examples 
were Aristophanes, specifically Knights and Frogs, Lysias in his Speeches and Thu-
cydides in the History of the Peloponnesian War. This review confirmed that those 
terms were not common, and when they appeared, they did in a descriptive capacity.
Next, it followed the examination of the philosophical tradition, characterized 
– to varying degrees – by the opposition to democracy, namely the Athenian. The 
three authors selected were Plato, with his Gorgias and Sophist, Aristotle’s Politics 
and the Constitution of the Athenians and, finally, a brief recount of Plutarch. With 
this in mind, the hypothesis could be confirmed: being a demagogue means, both 
in the pejorative sense (for the distrust in democracy) and the descriptive sense, 
to be a democratic leader, a rhetor in the assembly, a leader of the demos. Finally, 
the paper dealt with the question of why even the critics of democracy drew a line 
between Pericles and the ones who came after, for which the example of Nicias and 
Alcibiades’ debate prior to the Sicilian Expedition was explored.
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